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Abstract
In the classic herding model, agents receive private signals about an underlying binary state
of nature, and act sequentially to choose one of two possible actions, after observing the actions
of their predecessors.
We investigate what types of behaviors lead to asymptotic learning, where agents will even-
tually converge to the right action in probability. It is known that for rational agents and
bounded signals, there will not be asymptotic learning.
Does it help if the agents can be cooperative rather than act selfishly? This is simple to
achieve if the agents are allowed to use randomized protocols. In this paper, we provide the first
deterministic protocol under which asymptotic learning occurs. In addition, our protocol has
the advantage of being much simpler than previous protocols.
1 Introduction
When making decisions, we often have some amount of information which we have learned on our
own, but we also look to what choices other people have made in the past. In sequential learning
models, there is a sequence of agents N = {1, 2, . . .} who are interested in learning an unknown
state of the world θ ∈ {0, 1}. Each agent i receives a signal si that depends on the state, takes an
action ai ∈ {0, 1}, and receives a utility of 1 if the action matches the state, and utility 0 otherwise.
Each agent also observes the actions of her predecessors before choosing her own.
The classical result of [2, 3] is that from some point on, rational agents will disregard their own
private signal and emulate the actions of their predecessors, resulting in a herd in which almost all
the information is lost. In particular, asymptotic learning does not occur: the probability that the
ith agent chooses the correct action does not tend to one, as it would if the agents could observe
the signals (rather than the actions) of their predecessors.
A natural question is whether non-selfish agents can coordinate on a protocol in which they do
not always choose the action that is optimal given their information, but where asymptotic learning
does occur. Achieving this with probabilistic protocols is straightforward [1, 5]: for example [1],
one could have the ith agent choose an action that reveals her private signal with probability 1/i,
and choose her optimal action with probability 1− 1/i.
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In this paper, we show that asymptotic learning can also be achieved using a deterministic
protocol.
Theorem 1.1. There is a deterministic protocol that achieves asymptotic learning.
At the heart of the problem is a trade-off between optimization and communication. In order
for asymptotic learning to occur, agents must rely more and more on the information provided by
their predecessors’ actions, since their own private signals have a uniformly bounded amount of
information. However, if agents rely too much on previous observations, they will pass too little
information on through their own actions. The question of whether there are any deterministic
protocols under which asymptotic learning occurs is essentially the following: are there any deter-
ministic protocols which can strike the right balance between agents taking optimal actions and
agents using their actions to communicate their private information to their successors?
Our work raises some potentially interesting questions: in what reasonable economic settings
do selfish agents naturally coordinate and achieve asymptotic learning in equilibrium? And how
could one incentivize them to do so in other settings?
1.1 Related Work
The classical sequential learning papers [2, 3] have been followed by a large literature in Economics
(see, e.g., [9, 1, 6, 7], as well as Chamley’s book [4]) and engineering (see, e.g., [8, 5]). Smith and
Sørensen [9] showed that when private signals are unbounded (i.e., there is no limit to how strong
an indication a private signal can give) then agents do learn the state in the sequential setting; this
observation has motivated us—and others—to understand under what other conditions learning
can be achieved. As far as we know, [5] is the only other paper that studies related algorithmic
questions. In particular, in [5] it is shown how agents with bounded memory who observe only
some of their predecessors can achieve asymptotic learning using a randomized protocol.
2 Model
There is a countably infinite set of agents indexed by i ∈ N, acting sequentially and trying to learn
the hidden state of nature θ. In this paper, we focus on the most basic setting where both the
underlying state and the private signals are binary.
The state of nature θ is a random variable which takes values in {0, 1}. There are two Bernoulli
distributions D0 and D1 with parameters q0 and q1 respectively, i.e., D0 takes the value 1 with
probability q0 and similarly for D1. The agents know the distributions D0 and D1, but not the
state of nature θ. Each agent i receives a private signal si ∈ {0, 1}. The signals are i.i.d conditioned
on θ, drawn from the distribution Dθ. We are interested in the case where the private signals are
bounded, that is, both signals are possible regardless of the state. We assume without loss of
generality that 0 < q0 < q1 < 1. A simple example is that there is a 60/40 biased coin, but it could
be either biased to flip more heads or tails. Agents receive independent coin flips and together want
to distinguish which coin it is.
The agents act sequentially with each agent i choosing an action ai ∈ {0, 1}. Before making her
choice, agent i can observe her own signal si, as well as the actions {a1, . . . , ai−1} of the previous
agents, but crucially not the private signals of others. We say that there is asymptotic learning if
the actions of the agents converge to the true state θ in probability.
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Definition 2.1 (Asymptotic Learning). Let pi = Pr[ai = θ] be the probability of agent i choosing
the correct action. There is asymptotic learning if and only if lim inf i→∞ pi = 1.
We want to investigate whether asymptotic learning is possible when the agents must act
deterministically. Formally, the agents can agree on a protocol Π = {fi}i∈N, i.e., a sequence of
functions where fi : {0, 1}
i → {0, 1} describes the (deterministic) strategy of agent i, mapping all
the information she sees to the action she takes: ai = fi(a1, . . . , ai−1, si). Note that when we fix a
deterministic protocol, the probability pi of agent i answering correctly is only over the randomness
in the signals s1, . . . , si drawn from Dθ.
3 Our Deterministic Protocol
We start with two characterization results as a warm up before stating our protocol.
Fix a deterministic protocol Π.
Fact 1. Suppose that for some ǫ > 0, infinitely many agents disregard the information provided
by their predecessors and act only based on their private signals with probability at least ǫ. Then
learning does not occur under Π.
Fact 2. Suppose that there is a nonzero probability that only finitely many agents take an
action which depends on their private signal (and not just their predecessors’ actions). Then
asymptotic learning does not occur under Π.
The intuition behind Fact 1 is that whenever an agents relies on her own signal, she has a
constant probability of choosing an incorrect action. Fact 2 is a consequence of the observation
that if only finitely many agents rely on their own signals then an outside observer cannot learn
the state with probability tending to one, and hence neither can the agents.
Thus, in any protocol that achieves asymptotic learning, infinitely many agents must rely on
their signals, but the probability that agent i relies on her signal must vanish as i tends to infinity.
This is easily achieved using a randomized protocol, by asking agent i to act according to her signal
with (diminishing) probability 1/i. Since 1/i is not summable, by the Borel-Cantelli lemma there
will almost surely be infinitely many agents who reveal their signal.
Our deterministic protocol follows the same intuition. We want infinitely many agents to reveal
their signals, but each individual agent to reveal with diminishing probabilities. Our algorithm
can be viewed as derandomizing the random protocol described above, using the randomness in the
agents’ private signals. The actions of the revealing agents (which are equal to their private signals)
are observed by other agents to learn about θ, and are simultaneously used as randomness to select
the next revealing agent. It is worth noting that even though the sequence of revealing agents
is random, each agent (who observes the entire history of actions) knows exactly which subset of
predecessors revealed their private signals.
Formally, let tk denote the index of the k-th revealing agent. We define t1 = 1, t2 = at1 + 2,
and
tk =
k−1∑
j=1
atj · 2
j−1 + 2k−1.
The definition of tk partitions the agents into groups of size 2
j and picks exactly one agent in each
group: t1 ∈ {1}, t2 ∈ {2, 3}, . . . , tk ∈ {2
k−1, . . . , 2k − 1}. The actions of all the revealing agents
(atk−1 , . . . , at1) can be viewed as a number represented in binary, which decides the index of the
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Figure 1: An example of how our deterministic protocol selects the revealing agents. We assign the
agents to nodes on a complete binary tree level by level, the private signal of the revealing agents
are labelled on their nodes.
next revealing agent tk. We define the strategy of each agent depending on if she is revealing or
not. For a given i, let k be the unique integer with 2k−1 ≤ i < 2k. Then
fi(a1, · · · , ai−1, si) =
{
gk(at1 , . . . , atk−1 , si) if i 6= tk,
si if i = tk
where
gk(x1, . . . , xk) =
{
0 if 1
k
∑k
j=1 xj ≤
q0+q1
2 ,
1 if 1
k
∑k
j=1 xj >
q0+q1
2 .
Theorem 1.1 is a direct corollary of Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1. Let q0, q1 denote the parameters of the Bernoulli distributions D0 and D1 respectively.
We assume that ǫ < q0 < q1 < 1− ǫ and q1− q0 > 2ǫ for some constant ǫ > 0. The protocol {fi}i∈N
defined above satisfies pn ≥ 1− 2n
−ǫ2 for all n ∈ N.
Lemma 3.1 follows immediately from Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3.
Lemma 3.2. The probability of agent n being a revealing agent is at most n−ǫ.
Proof. Fix an index i with 2k−1 ≤ i < 2k, i.e., agent i is on the kth level of the binary tree. If
agent i is selected as a revealing agent, we must have tk = i. This happens if and only if the private
signals of the first k − 1 revealing agents form the binary representation of the number (i− 2k−1).
In other words, there is a unique path from the root of the tree to agent i and we must always take
the correct edges to reach i. Observe that the private signals of the first k − 1 revealing agents
are drawn i.i.d. from Dθ. Since ǫ < q0 < q1 < 1 − ǫ, each private signal matches the binary
representation of i with probability at most 1 − ǫ. Therefore, we conclude that the probability
agent n with n ≥ 2k−1 is on the paths is at most
(1− ǫ)k−1 ≤ e−ǫ(k−1) =
(
2k−1
)
−ǫ log2(e)
≤ n−ǫ log2(e) ≤ n−ǫ.
where we use in the first step that 1− x ≤ e−x for all x ∈ R.
Lemma 3.3. When agent n is not a revealing agent, she answers correctly with probability at least
1− n−ǫ
2
.
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Proof. Fix an index n with 2k−1 ≤ n < 2k. Agent n has access to the actions of the revealing
agents t1, . . . , tk−1 since tk < 2
k−1. Because these agents reveal their private signals, agent i has at
least k i.i.d. samples from Dθ (including her own signal). She can simply take the average of these
samples and check if the empirical mean is closer to q0 or q1 to guess the hidden state θ. Note that
most of the agents are not revealing, and they are acting rationally.
Let q¯ = q0+q12 . Since we assumed that q1 − q0 ≥ 2ǫ, we have that |q¯ − qθ| ≥ ǫ. Therefore, as
long as the empirical mean of the k samples has additive error less than ǫ, agent i will be able to
guess θ correctly. By standard application of Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds, we have
Pr


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
k

k−1∑
j=1
atj + si

− qθ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ

 ≤ exp(−2kǫ2) ≤ n−ǫ2 .
We are now ready to prove Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. We prove the protocol {fi}i∈N defined as above satisfies pn ≥ 1− 2n
−ǫ2 . The
claim then follows from the assumption that ǫ > 0 is a constant.
Agent n can pick the wrong action due to one of the two reasons:
1. Agent n is revealing, and her private signal is different from θ. The probability of this event
is upper bounded by the probability that agent n is revealing, which is n−ǫ by Lemma 3.2.
2. The agent is not revealing, but the previous information leads to the wrong conclusion on θ.
By Lemma 3.3, this happens with probability at most n−ǫ
2
.
We conclude the proof by taking a union bound over these two cases.
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